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terrorism and the constitution
christopher L blakesley
in september 1982 innocent men women and children were
slaughtered in the refugee camps at sabra and shatila lebanon by
lebanese christian forces dependent on israel on 15 june 1985
robert stethem was shot and killed aboard the hijacked TWA flight
847 2 on 7 october 1985 the italian cruise liner achille lauro was
hijacked and leon klinghofer was killed and thrown overboard 3 on
2 july 1986 rodrigo rojas was mortally wounded when he was doused
with gasoline and set afire while walking with protestorse in santiago
chile 4 the soviets are alleged to leave booby trapped dolls for afghan
moujahadeen children 5 the united states government has given both
direct and indirect support to the nicaraguan contras who allegedly
have killed innocent nicaraguansNicaragua in conjunction with their guerilla
warfare 6 it is also alleged that the sandinistasS i have killed innocents in
maintaining their power 7 these tragic episodes continue the ugly saga
of terrorism this modem mal du sieclec
at the closing of the iran contra hearings session with lieutenant
colonel oliver north senator inouye addressed the issue of illegal
superior orders and a soldiersasoldie legal and moral obligation to disobey
them senator inouye alluded to the nuremberg trials and appeared to
suggest that we through that tribunal made it abundantly clear that
failure to disobey illegal superior orders may be cfiminalr and if so
should incur punishment brandon sullivan colonel norths attorney
objected vociferously to the allusion to the nuremberg trials and noted
that he found the allusion personally and professionally distasteful the
objection succeeded in diverting senator inouye from his tack
the line of questioning and the allusion however distasteful
appears apt the evidence suggests that orders may have been given
which a reasonable soldier would have known were illegal they related
to possible illegal funding of groups that were known to have committed
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violence against innocent noncombatantsc mbat nts in nicaragua conduct that
when committed by other less acceptable groups is condemned as
terrorism if the groups were known to have been committing criminal
acts those supporting them may be considered guilty as alders and
abettorst it is ironic that funds to support the allegedly terroristic acts of
the contras should have been raised by the sale ofweapons to iran which
is alleged to have connections to those who attacked the US marine
barracks in lebanon as well as to the perpetrators of many of the acts of
terrorism noted at the beginning of this article these orders were
apparently given and obeyed in secrecy allegedly to save lives the line
of questioning and the conduct that gave rise to it raise significant issues
of international and domestic criminal law which in turn prompt
serious questions of constitutional law in relation to the international
arena the conduct of the reagan administration in this and other
instances also poses serious questions about the constitutional separation
of powers and checks and balances when questions of important foreign
policy are concerned these events and our reaction to terrorism provide
a vehicle for studying the role and relationship of congress the
executive and the judiciary in matters ofwar and foreign affairs at a point
where constitutional international and criminal law converge
how do terrorism and the iran contra hearings relate to the
constitution my thesis is that there is a tendency for the executive of this
or any nation to eschew even constitutionally mandated avenues of
problem solving considered to be cumbersome inefficient or inimical
to the executives vision of the national interest in foreign affairs there
is also a tendency to consider oness own conduct and the conduct ofoness
allies and friends to be justified when it is directed at goals deemed by the
executive branch to be good constitutional provisions based on the
checks and balances and separation of powers are sometimes cumber-
some and inefficient for resolving some pressing problems sometimes
congress disagrees with executive policy sometimes the judiciary must
consider whether conduct in foreign affairs has met legal or constitu-
tional muster
today there appear to be few more pressing problems than
terrorism because combating terrorism is so important there is a
tendency for the executive branch to eschew the constitution and
constitutional procedures when they get in the way of policy
objectives this tendency is exacerbated when the battle against
terrorism is coupled with other pressing and important policies such
as keeping communism from gaining another foothold in our
hemisphere but we must ask whether in the name ofantiterrorisman ite rorisa tilt rr we
have become terrorists whether in the name of anticommunismcom unisunist and
antitotalitarianismto alitarianis we have allowed erosion of antitotalitarianto alitaria
protections in our constitution and constitutional order
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WHAT IS TERRORISM
we have all heard the simple aphorism one persons terrorist is
anothersother freedom fighter the aphorism sometimes taken seriously
misses the point the issue is whether certain conduct perpetrated by
government officials soldiers police freedom fighters insurgents in a
civil war or dissidents is criminal wars of national liberation wars of
any kind are by definition violent murderously so they are akin to
murder and probably turn many of the participants on both sides into
victims executionersecution or both sartre was correct but incomplete in
aphorizing that once begun it a war of national liberation is a war that
gives no quarter 8 today no war does killing in war sadly is deemed
by nations and other groups to be justifiable or acceptable
some conduct however even within war and thus a fortiori
during times of relative peace is not justifiable or acceptable A fight
for gaining or retaining power or even for survival may cause people
to do unspeakable things but we do not have to justify or even
accommodate such behavior this has long been recognized for
example in 634 AD caliph abu bakr charged the moslem arab armynn
invading christian syria do not commit treachery nor depart from the
right path you must not mutilate neither kill a child or aged man or
woman 9 killing of babes in arms for example is not acceptable it is
murder perpetrators of such murder are prosecutable and have been
prosecuted 10
substantive criminal law and customary international law consider
certain kinds of conduct criminal as is evidenced by among other things
the complex of international treaties on such subjects as hijacking
hostage taking human rights and the laws of war we may call such
crimes terrorism but it is not necessary to do so 11 what makes this
conduct different from straightforward domestic criminal law is that the
conduct is perpetrated in pursuit of some political military ideological
or religiose end 12 including anarchy or nihilism as well as rebellion or
oppression and the fact that it has an international impact or has been
condemned by international customary or positive law the political
military religiose or ideological purpose is not necessary to render the
conduct criminal but it is helpful in determining conduct that may be
considered an international crime and that should therefore trigger
universal jurisdiction if the child of a head of state or a tribal leader were
murdered in order to intimidate the leader or gain some other advantage
the crime would not only be murder but a crime triggering universal
jurisdiction the same would be true of governmental conduct such as
kidnapping torture and murder of the population in order to intimidate
and quell dissent it should not matter whether such conduct transcended
international boundaries
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wantonly reckless or intentional killing of noncombatantsc mbatant during
war is a war crime when there is no declared war the wanton or
intentional killing of peacetime analoguesi to noncombatantsc mbatant well call
them innocents is also a crime to add that it is an international
crime should not cause confusion the conduct becomes internationally
or universally prosecutable when it is perpetrated pursuant to
political military ideological or religiose aims or when it is otherwise
in violation of international customary law including that protecting
human rights
affirmative defenses may obtain but the motive or purpose behind
the conduct is not one of them it may be a defense however if a
combatant is killed during war or an equivalent during nondeclaredl r r
hostilities in international law as in criminal law it is justifiable to kill
ones attacker it is also justifiable to attack or kill opponent combatants
or their equivalent in a rebellion insurrection or other uprising or
guerilla war what is not justifiable is the use of noncombatantsc mbatant or their
equivalent as targets no matter how lofty the goal self defense is
sometimes asserted as a justificationajustificatio but it is never self defense to attack
an innocent even if killing the innocent would preserve the life of the
defendant self preservation is not self defense 13
some have suggested that it is inappropriate to determine what
international conduct is criminal by focusing on the object or purpose of
the conduct they argue that generally crime is defined by an act not
by motive or object and that we should delineate a crime by what is done
not why it is done or to whom however a crime requires a mens rea as
well as an actus reus culpability is based on the defendants mental stateones motive may not be relevant but ones knowledge or intent
regarding the object will be for example if someone knows he is killing
a person rather than a deer he has a mental state that will establish
criminal homicide on the other hand if someone kills a deer sincerely
believing it is a person he may not be convicted of criminal homicide
similarly a war crime is committed when violence is perpetrated
intentionally or wantonly against noncombatantsc mbatant even though the same
conduct is not criminal if committed against combatants A homicide
will be justified if committed against a person attacking with deadly
force but the killing will be murder if intentionally or knowingly
committed against an innocent one who is not attacking with deadly
force even if the killing is to save ones own life thus it is substantively
necessary to take into account the object of the allegedly criminal
conduct to determine whether it is criminal culpability is often based on
the object of the conduct in conjunction with the perpetrators mental
state regarding that object therefore it is perfectly appropriate even
necessary to define criminal terrorism by taking the object and the
mental state about that object into account
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the term innocent will be used in this article to mean noncom
batantsu or their peacetime equivalents there is nojustificationnojustificati forkillingilli
individuals hors de combat oppression may be analogized to an attack
allowing for justified revolutions based on a theory of self defense the
self defense attacks however must be directed against individuals
holding the status of combatants or their peacetime equivalents the
determination ofwhether an individual is a combatant may be difficult
in a given case but drawing such lines is the job of the judiciary in all
nations
the reagan administration has argued that it is justifiable self
defense to abduct terrorists from abroad and to attack and bomb
nations harboring terrorists the administration has further argued that
a decision to take such measures is per se legal in that no other nation or
institution may question it 14 one danger of this position of course is that
other nations or groups may use it as well could the soviet union
justify a preemptive strike against the united states could any group
that considers itself violated by US policies justify similar conduct
why not if self justification is elevated to the level of legality there is
no rule of law in any crucial context 1 5I if one has the power to succeed
one is justified
one danger in such a self defining vision of self defense lies in
what it might cause one to do or to become the old german notion of
dassrecht combined with that of necessary defense notwehrthweNot and the
soviet version of the same notions neobkhodimaya oboronad are very
similar to the current US administrations view of self defense these
notions hold that any right or defendable interest from life to personal
honor is entitled to the same degree ofprotection and privilege the only
question is whether a right or interest is threatened if so whatever force
is required to prevent the invasion of the right or interest is justified 16 in
both the german and the soviet conceptualization of necessary
defense the notions of legal order die rechtsordnung and social
danger protivopravnyi identify necessary defense with protection of
the legal order itself 17 thus the germans justified attacks on the
sudetenland and poland at the beginning of world war 11II and the
elimination of such threats to the legal order as jews deviates the
insane or other mental deficients and the stalinist USSR justified the
liquidation of enemies of the state in the name of necessary defense
even if killing innocents is deemed effective to promote an end
considered by the actors to be good even if it actually is an efficient
means to intimidate a government or dissident group or to render a
population insecure it does not need to be accepted as morally justified
or legal the claim of the oppressed that a child is the enemy because she
will inherit the benefits of the oppressors is unacceptable just as it is
unacceptable to oppress or to allow other governments or other groups
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to oppress it is not acceptable for combatant forces to hole themselves
up and use innocent noncombatant civilians as shields this is a form of
oppression or terrorism similarly however it is not acceptable to bomb
villages because one wishes to prompt a coup detat or because one
believes that some enemy or terrorist forces may be hiding or inter-
spersed therein
we and our real or perceived enemies are in the habit of justifying
conduct that if it were perpetrated against us would be considered
criminal we all seem to be caught up as albert camus said in some
infernal dialectic that whatever kills one side kills the other too each
blaming the other and justifying his violence by the opponents violence
the eternal question as to who was first responsible loses all meaning
then but camus goes on to say we can at least refrain from what
makes it unforgiveable the murder of the innocent I1181I1 I trust that camus
was right when he said that humanity generally does not want to be victim
or executioner 19 when we participate in or accept oppression or the
slaughter of innocents however no matter how lofty the articulated end
we simply become oppressors or slaughterersaught r of innocents there is a
common core of values that condemns this oppression and slaughter
it is easy to slip into camussdmus infernal dialectic from the
perspective of those who are oppressed it is easy to believe that all law
including that prohibiting violence against innocents works to continue
the oppression children of the oppressors can be seen as enemies as they
will inherit the fruit of oppression jeanpaulpa sartre put the argument
well
A fine sight they are too the believers in nonviolenceviole saying that they are
neither executionersecutioners nor victims very well then ifyoure not victims when
the government which youve voted for when the army in which your
younger brothers are serving without hesitation or remorse have undertaken
race murder you are without a shadow of doubt executionersecutioners try to
understand this at any rate if violence began this very evening and if
exploitation and oppression had never existed on the earth perhaps the
slogans ofnonviolenceviole might end the quarrel but if the whole regime even
your nonviolentviole ideas are conditioned by a thousand year old oppression
your passivity serves only to place you in the ranks of the oppressors 20
thus the oppressed perceive international law as fostering and
promoting their oppression 21 they argue accurately that the oppression
is a form of violence against innocents themselves the violence and
oppression against them began ages ago and still continues so they
determine to strike out with similar violence against the oppressors
through those who will inherit the fruits of the oppression alternatively
they argue that since the rules of todays international society foster
oppression terror violence against the oppressed the oppressed are
not bound to obey the rules thus as a means to break the yoke of
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oppression and terror they sometimes opt for violence violence is
justified under certain circumstances but sometimes the oppressed
group will opt to reject the rule prohibiting violence against noncom
batantst nu or their equivalent as a means to break the yoke of oppression
why they argue should we abide by rules that provide for others at our
expense that function to oppress and do violence to us
however valid the arguments of the oppressed in todays world
any violence they direct against noncombatantsc mbatant works only to allow the
oppressors to feel justified in their oppression or at least to sell to their
constituents the view that they are justified in using violence to maintain
their power when innocent civilians are attacked by those claiming to
represent the oppressed citizens of the oppressing power they naturally
side with their government the government feeling the support of the
people tends to increase its own oppression or counterviolence against
the originally oppressed oppression and counterviolence both increase
rather than decrease in a frightening cycle
thus we seem to have slipped quite easily into the ancient
mentality of the blood feud lex talionis an eye for an eye calls the
victims or the victims proxies to carry out the sanction against the
victimizers 221 retaliation is aimed at the collectivity of the actual or
perceived oppressors any member of the opposing group call it the
family clan tribe people nation state is fairly subject to retaliation
the retaliator is not viewed by his or her own group as a criminal or
terrorist because he or she is an instrument of the groups need to avenge
itself once this occurs the other group feels justified in a counter-
reprisal and the vendetta rages
we must escape this cycle no endjustifiesj stifi s oppression or violence
against innocents we must condemn it it violates domestic and interna-
tional law the best way to combat terrorism is to work at eliminating the
oppression and depredation forms of terrorism themselves that are at
its root domestic and international law provide a means to combat both
aspects of terrorism they provide a means to keep pressure on perpetra-
tors of oppression and to prosecute and punish all violence against
innocents whether committed for intimidation or other military politi
cal ideological or religiose ends attempts to circumvent the rule of law
only lend impetus to the cycle of violence and terror when these
attempts are combined with efforts to avoid congressional participation
in policymakinga i or oversight or to prevent the judiciary from reviewing
conduct that mightbetit b in violation of law or constitutional provisions
they also pose a serious threat to our constitutional republic no matter
what justification is claimed
if our government by its policy and action promotes or condones
terroristic conduct by the contras in nicaragua or other groups else-
where in the name of democracy it is rejecting the rule of law
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unfortunately some ideologuesi believe that terrorism is inevitable and
that the rule of law must be pushed aside to combat it these people are
also likely to argue that just as there is no law when it comes to
international relations there is no appropriate legal definition of
terrorism one persons terrorist is anothersother freedom fighterto be sure difficulties arise in trying to combat terrorism by means
of international law states often refuse to extradite or prosecute perpe-
trators of terror violence when it is committed for a cause they deem
good 231 while such failures are unfortunate they do not affect the legal
definition of terrorism violation of the law or failure to enforce it does
not negate the law itselflL 24 if consistent enforcement is the essence of law
or is necessary for law to exist there is no law at all 251 international law
has been and will continue to be a means among others that are effectual
in combating terrorism the point is however that to eliminate the rule
of law in order to combat terrorism more efficiently may be more
dangerous than terrorism itself without the rule of law power alone
becomes the keystone of relations substantive and procedural constitu-
tional protections are left aside
in order to establish a consistent policy and means to protect
humanity against terror violence it is necessary to provide a legal
definition of the crime or crimes that we condemn as terrorism to do
this we must distinguish justifiable violence perpetrated against an
enemy in war or insurgency from acts of terrorism it is necessary to
determine who constitutes an enemy and who among the enemy
may be subject to legal violence given the rhetoric of the day this may
not be an easy task it may be that because the law condones violence in
certain circumstances the key to objectively identifying terrorism will
be the law of war and substantive criminal law
the late professor richard baxter articulated the commonly felt
sense of futility in trying to define terrorism we have cause to regret
that a legal concept of terrorism was ever inflicted upon us the termin
is imprecise it is ambiguous and above all it serves no operative legal
purpose in fact however no legal definition of anything makes any
sense except in terms of the purpose for which it is applied if we can
decide what our purpose is in preventing the violence most people fear
and call terrorism we will have the working definition we need
I1 agree with what I1 believe is the sense of baxters statement of
regret and frustration it is not good to have a legal definition of terrorism
or even to use the term if it is to be used for legalistic quibbling and
obfuscation or as a rhetorical device to achieve ulterior ends or to justify
ones own counterconductntercon which may in itself be criminal or violative
of civil liberties or other aspects of the constitution or international law
for example consider the so called shultz doctrine to apply military
force to preempt terrorism or to retaliate against terrorists or states
terrorism and the constitution 205
supporting harboring or training terrorists 26 caspar weinberger as
secretary of defense opposed such responsive military strikes because
they kill women and children 11271 in addition one can agree with baxter
in another sense the termin terrorism is perhaps not necessary if the
conduct that constitutes it falls within a common core of criminality that
is universally condemned anyway 281
without participating extensively in the debate over what the
properly complete legal definition of terrorism might be it is appropriate
to determine what sort of conduct clearly is terrorism there may be no
need for an abstract allii encompaspasssing definition but there is a need to
establish the elements of the offenses we consider as terrorism or
whatever else we may wish to call it to convict an actus reus and mens
rea must be proved for the purpose of this article at least I1 will adopt
a very limited definition terrorism is the application of violence against
innocent individuals for the purpose of obtaining some military
political ideological or religiose end 29 29terrorismterroris is conduct wherein
the perpetrators do violence to innocents including taking them hostage
in order to intimidate a nation or population or to reap some other
political ideological or military advantage or benefit an innocent is a
person who is not an attacker or an aider and abettor of an attacker to
be an aider or abettor one must have the same intent or criminal mental
state as the attacker in this sense terrorism can be committed by the
military even during a war when the state allows or ignores purposeful
or reckless killing of innocents 30 A crime against humanity such as
genocide torture or apartheid is a form of terrorism 31 what we call it
does not really matter it is all illegal and immoral terror violence
violence is justified in self defense or when it occurs in revolution
or breaking the yoke of oppression some ideologuesl i would extend this
justification to violence against innocent civilians when it is committed
for a just cause but violence against innocents is never justified self
defense does not comprehend the killing of innocents those not in a
mode of attack upon us or the use of innocents as a means to self
preservation one is not justified in slitting a weaker persons throat and
drinking his blood or eating his flesh because one will starve otherwise 32
A nation may not justifiably starve or attack and destroy or otherwise
oppress a group or nation inside or outside its borders to benefit the
majority of the population or the power elite any group that adopts such
a tactic that oppresses or commits terror violence or promotes or
condones its use whether in the name of god or in the name of
communism or democracy or any other piety has no room to
complain about the other side doing the same condemnation of
terrorism by those who use it or condone its use by other states or its
favorite freedom fighters is hollow terrorism committed by a group
against a nation or its nationals should not be an excuse to commit the
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same against innocents of that group we should be beyond the blood
feud mentality of using innocent noncombatant members of our
enemies population as proxies for our vengeance or expiation or as tools
for promoting our interests through intimidation
whether the terror violence occurs in a setting where it should be
called a war crime a crime against humanity or state or group terrorism
it is condemnable terror violence terrorism from this point of view is
simply violent crime and so it has traditionally been considered by
anglo american continental islamic and other systems of jurispru-
dence 33 international law condemns this conduct and provides for
jurisdiction to be asserted over each of these types of terrorism on the
basis of at least three legal theories the universality theory which would
allow the state obtaining jurisdiction over the person to prosecute the
protective principle and the territorial theory 341 prosecution is called for
and appropriate perhaps this presents a phenomenological vision of law
it is submitted thatmost ifnot all peoples consider violence against their
own noncombatantsc mbat nts whether done by powers that are over them or by
outsiders to be evil and illegal violence against innocents triggers the
justification for revolution and for violence but not for violence by proxy
against the evildoers noncombatantsc mbatant if a thing is evil or illegal when
committed against ones own it is illegal when done against others even
against the original evildoers such conduct should be and is a crime
whether committed by a government by a soldier during a war or civil
insurrection or by a member of a political or guerilla group A united
states district court noted in the letelier murder case
there is no discretion to commit or to have ones officers or agents commit
an illegal act whatever policy options may exist for a foreign country
it has no discretion to perpetrate conduct designed to result in the
assassination of an individual or individuals action that is clearly contrary
to the precepts of humanity as recognized in both national and international
law 35
international and domestic law equip us to extricate ourselves from
the infemalfernal dialectic of violence they provide the means whereby we
may avoid accepting or participating in even by acquiescence oppres-
sion or the slaughter of innocents for this means to be effective
however we must accept the rule of law at every level and not be misled
by public relations techniques designed to obfuscate or to justify conduct
when no justification is appropriate it is the responsibility of our
executive and legislative branches to ensure that no policies promoting
violence against innocents to advance goals of any kind are adopted it
is the responsibility of us all not to acquiesce in the perpetration or
support of terrorism and to subject its perpetrators to appropriate prose-
cution it is the responsibility of the justice department to prosecute
other members of the executive branch just as it must prosecute other
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individuals who commit terrorism if the justice department fails to
prosecute or if there is significant conflict of interest it is necessary to
appoint a special prosecutor it is the responsibility of our judiciary not
to hide behind the political question doctrine and to decide when illegal
and unconstitutional conduct occurs
TERRORISM COMMUNISM CABALS
AND THE constitution
the framers of the constitution left no doubt about their intention
to protect our liberty by scrupulous separation of powers and significant
checks and balances alexander hamilton for example declared there
is no liberty if the power ofjudging be not separated from the legislative
and executive powers 36 the constitution is clear that policy develop-
ment in foreign affairs is to be a jointajoin effort the executive and legislative
branches make the policy for the people and the judiciary decides
whether the policy even though it relates to foreign affairs is constitu-
tional the executive branch even with the advice and consent of the
senate cannot constitutionally enter into a treaty with another nation that
would for example promote slavery or apartheid or that would elimi-
nate due process for those found in the united states and charged with
terrorism clearly the judiciary has a role to play in matters of foreign
relations
the executive branch has had a tendency to want to rid itself of the
inconvenience of having to deal with congress and the judiciary in
matters of grave importance in international relations some have
argued in defense of this policy that congress only has the power to
declare war 51371 congress seems often to have acquiesced in executive
arrogation of power in matters of foreign affairs and especially in the area
ofwar powers moreover the senate has recently acquiesced in elimina
tion of the judicial role in a matter quintessentially and traditionally
judicial of deciding questions of law and fact relating to human liberty
at least when one of our close allies charges that a person has committed
a terrorist act the executive branch negotiated a treaty with the united
kingdom whereby requests for extradition based on specified terrorist
conduct will allow only the executive branch to consider the legal and
factual issues of whether the conduct constituted a political offense
and is therefore not extraditable 381
extradition is the means by which one nation may seek the return
of fugitives who have escaped to another country 391 extradition treaties
provide for extradition on a showing of probable cause that the fugitive
committed an extraditable offense this means that a decision must be
made as to whether the treaty applies to the circumstances alleged to have
occurred and whether the evidence suggests that there is probable cause
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to believe the person accused committed the prohibited acts thus it is
a question of law the application of the treaty and of fact because the
decision to extradite deprives an individual of basic liberties it is as a
matter of due process and separation of powers a question for the
judiciary to decide 40
the political offense exception developed from principles of
asylum and sovereignty 41 it allows one nation to refuse to extradite a
fugitive if the offense charged in the extradition request is of a political
nature it is designed for those situations wherein the fugitive is a
defeated partisan in an insurrection or civil war or for those individuals
charged with crimes after having been defeated in an attempted revolu-
tion or war for self determination it recognizes the right to revolt and to
use violence to escape oppression and applies to those situations in which
a person or group commits violence against the military or combatant
political forces that have imposed the yoke of oppression on them 421
although the political offense exception recognizes that violence is
justified in certain circumstances it does not include violence and terror
against innocents these no matter how they may be glorified are
immoral and criminal even when perpetrated by those claiming to
defend democracy or by those claiming to fend off oppression the
political offense exception does not apply to this criminal terror
violence
the political offense exception has been part of our extradition law
since the beginning ofmodem extradition practice in the mid nineteenth
century it is part of the extradition law of virtually all nations except
those in the soviet orbit 431 the exception presents issues of mixed law
and fact was there an insurrection was violence used against innocents
or noncombatantsc mbat nts and issues of law were the people attacked noncom
batantsu what is an insurrection for purposes of the political offense
exception its resolution impacts on human liberty thus the consti-
tution calls for this determination to be made by the judiciary even
though one may infer from article 3 section 1 that the constitution
allows the legislative branch to determine the jurisdiction of the
judiciary it is fair to say that the legislature may not define jurisdiction
so as to eliminate thejudiciary from deciding questions at the intersection
of due process and human liberty 44 article 3 section 2 provides that
trial of all crimes shall be by jury implying that some sort of court
will consider such matters
the current administration has claimed that the political offense
exception promotes terrorism it does not while courts have made and
will make in the future some errors most of the time they correctly
decide political offense cases 451 congress could draft legislation that
could provide sufficiently clear guidelines and standards for application
of the political offense exception to eliminate most of what is left of the
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possibility for judicial error indeed the state and justice departments
had drafted such legislation and presented it to congress then the
reagan administration found it expedient to withdraw their support of
this legislation because they found it preferable to remove the issue from
the realm of law and the courts altogether 46
the supplementary convention on extradition between the united
states and the united kingdom was ratified effectively removing the
judiciary from the process of deciding whether conduct fits the political
offense exception to extradition since terrorism as defined in this article
would not fit the political offense exception anyway the only impact the
supplementary convention has is to eliminate the judiciary from
considering the issue and applying the exception in situations in which
it ought to apply the supplementary treaty with great britain effec-
tively eliminates the political offense exception except for the offenses
of sedition treason and espionage it is another example of the executive
branch this time with the advice and consent of the senate attempting
to arrogate power to itself in the arena of foreign affairs especially when
terrorism or war is involved
there has been a tendency for the congress and even the judiciary
to accept the erroneous proposition that the arena of foreign affairs ought
to be exclusively within the executive prerogative 471 the so called
political question doctrine has allowed the supreme court to eschew
decision making in the arena of foreign affairs it would seem however
that the court ought not evade its responsibility to decide a case wherein
constitutional values are at issue just because the issues are also related
to foreign affairs and have been the subject of a treaty provision ratified
by the senate it does not follow that the courts cannot hear them
agreement in a treaty coupled with the advice and consent of the senate
is not a mechanism for avoiding constitutional scrutiny or removing the
judiciary from its constitutional mandate to decide questions of fact and
law relating to human liberty the supplementary convention on extra
ditiona is an attempt to do just that the creation of a secret cabal to sell
arms to iran and to finance the contras without legislative input or
oversight is an even more ominous attempt to evade the constitutional
separation of powers
the constitution reflects the concern of the founding fathers
about the tendency of the executive to try to consolidate power and to
weaken checks on its pursuance of its goals james madison warned
against attempts by the executive branch to appropriate congresss war
powers for example
every just view that can be taken of this subject admonishes the public of
the necessity of a rigid adherence to the simple the received and the
fundamental doctrine of the constitution that the power to declare war
including the power ofjudgingofjudgin of the causes ofwar is fully and exclusively
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vested in the legislature that the executive has no right in any case to
decide the question whether there is or is not a cause for declaring war that
the right of convening and informing congress whenever such a question
seems to call for a decision is all the right which the constitution has
deemed requisite or proper and that for such more than for any other
contingency this right was specially given to the executive 481
abraham lincoln understood the wisdom of the founders in
providing constitutional checks on the war powers of the executive
kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars
pretending generally if not always that the good of the people was the
object this our delegates to the constitutional convention understood to
be the most oppressive of all kingly oppressionsi and they resolved to so
frame the constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing
oppression upon us 49
henry clay noted that this aspect of the united states constitution was
unique everywhere else the power of declaring war resided with the
executive here it was deposited with the legislature 501
the executive branch has a tendency to suggest that since matters
of foreign affairs such as the war powers for example are subject to the
power of the executive in other nations they should belong exclusively
to the executive in the united states as well article 1 section 8 of the
united states constitution provides unambiguously that congress shall
have power to declare war only congress has the authority to
establish a state of war or to approve or ratify an act of war 51 today
however declaration of war virtually never occurs 52 some have argued
that congress only has power to declare war leaving the executive with
full discretion over the use of military forces in any situation where a
formal declaration of war has not been made 53 rostow argues that the
term to declare war is unique to international law and that it must be
understood pursuant to international law he further asserts
the international powers of the united states are conferred and defined by
international law internationally the government of the united states pos-
sesses all the powers possessed by any other state under international law
including the sovereign power to violate international law the constitution
commits these powers to the political discretion of congress and the
president in accordance with the principle of functional necessityityl54
rostow argues that functional necessity requires that the president
alone sometimes have the power to make war that is to commit acts of
55war
it is a strange view of law to consider it as sanctioning the notion
that one may violate it at will if one has the power no doubt the power
to do so sometimes exists but does power equal law it seems more
accurate to say that although nations in the international arena like
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individuals in a domestic arena sometimes have the power or the luck to
avoid sanction when they violate a law this does not mean that the law
validates its own violation what germany did during world war II11 was
arguably legal under germanysaG domestic positive law but it was not
legal under international law this would have been true whether
germany got away with it or not furthermore just because some
allied nations and their officials committed war crimes during worldwar 11II or other wars and were not prosecuted or punished it does not
follow that there was no international law in operation
behind this notion of sovereignty and functional necessity there
lies the assumption that there is no international law except that based on
consent moreover this functional necessity view of international law is
also thought sufficient to overcome constitutional mandates or at least
to control the definition and application of constitutional principles and
terminology when foreign affairs are concerned thus according to this
school of thought we are to read our constitution in accordance with
notions of functional necessity and in the same fashion that other nations
would read theirs and since the sovereign power in the international
sphere is generally controlled by the executive it follows for the
functional necessity advocates that the president alone must have this
power and constitutional authority this is really nothing more than the
reductionistic view that the power of sovereignty includes unbridled
freedom to act even in violation of norms recognized by all peoples and
nations and even against the thrust of constitutional language and
history it is a view that the executive branch can function with impunity
in the realm ofwar fighting terrorism and perhaps even generally in the
arena of foreign relations this argument from sovereignty and func-
tional necessity in foreign affairs rings suspiciously like that totalitarian
executive power about which so many of the founding fathers and
president lincoln warned
there is no doubt that when the nation is attacked the president
may call out the troops and may commit our forces in self defense even
this however must be ratified by congress 561 not only must congress
ratify acts of war it also has the power to establish basic policy goals and
strategies relating to war and foreign affairs it has the power to provide
for the common defense to regulate commerce among nations to declare
war to grant letters of marque and reprisal to provide and maintain a
navy to raise and support armies and to provide for organizing and
calling out the militia 57 congress also has the power to make all laws
necessary and proper to accomplish these constitutional objectives 58
these powers explicitly provided congress by the constitution demon-
strate the speciousness of the functional necessity argument
the functional necessity argument denigrates the constitution
by placing it on the same plane as international law even though the
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constitutional division of powers is the superior norm in our constitu-
tional republic moreover the international law described by the notion
of functional necessity is not international law at all but merely the rule
of superior power ironically then the functional necessity view
posits a lawless international order to warrant adoption of a construction
of the constitution that eviscerates traditional limitations all to the
proclaimed end of furthering goals perceived to be required by a
dangerous world but a dangerous world is not rendered less dangerous
if we adopt totalitarian practices in order to fight totalitarianism or when
we use terrorist means to fight terrorism indeed the constitutional
checks and balances provide the wherewithal to ensure that we do not
violate international law or destroy our constitutional republic through
precipitous executive action
the conduct I1 have described as terrorism poses a vicious threat to
human dignity it must be condemned whether it emanates from states
against inhabitants of their own territory in violation of human rights
law or against noncombatantsc mbatant extraterritorially it is criminal whether
perpetrated by groups of insurgents or those struggling for independence
or freedom from oppression its criminality can be determined by
customary international law and domestic substantive criminal law
the greatest danger posed by terrorism to our democracy and
constitutional republic may be our executive branchsenc overreaction to it
and use of terrorism as an excuse to erode the constitutionally mandated
sharing of powers in the realm of foreign affairs war powers and
combating international crime ifwe are to avoid manifest hypocrisy the
destruction of the rule of law and erosion of our primary democratic and
constitutional values we must be vigilant and avoid participating in
criminal conduct either directly or as alders and abettors we must not
allow hysteria to cause us to accept an arrogation of power by the
executive branch at the expense of the other two branches although
congress is sometimes cumbersome and the judiciary may make
mistakes these institutions are set in the constitution as checks and
balances for our domestic protection against autocracy whether
combating terrorism is accomplished by means of extradition and
prosecution of alleged perpetrators or by a decision to initiate acts ofwar
the constitutional order must be preserved
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